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Microeconomics IV

Microeconomics IV

En pratique :

Volume horaire de cours : 24
Volume horaire global de TD : 12
Langue principale : Anglais

Description du contenu de l'enseignement

Game Theory analyzes decision making in a context of strategic interdependency. Strategic interdependency
occurs when a decision maker is aware that her / his actions affect the decisions of other decision makers and in turn her / his own decisions are impacted by other decision makers. Such a context is frequent in the case of business decisions.
In the last 30 years, Game Theory has become the core of economics, both macro and micro.
Game Theory uses formal and analytical tools from economics and mathematics.These allow us to understand the rational approach to decision making. These also serve as a benchmark to compare actual decisions to theoretical predictions. The course introduces the
main concepts and tools of Game Theory.
You will learn how to represent an economic situation as a game and how to analyze it using different equilibrium concepts proposed in the literature. Ideas such as dominance, backward induction and Nash equilibrium, are discussed and applied to examples drawn from economics, politics... Finally, you will play several games such as ultimatum game, investment game, public good game, etc. in a room dedicated to laboratory experiments, and you will confront your decisions made in the game with standard predictions of game theory.

Readings

  • Binmore (1992): Fun and Games, A Text on Game Theory, Houghton Mifflin
  • Camerer (2003): Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments on Strategic Interaction
  • Eichberger, J. (1993). Game Theory for Economists, Academic Press, San Diego
  • Fudenberg, D., Tirole, J. (1991). Game Theory, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachussets
  • Mas-Collel, A., Whinston, M. D., Green, J. R. (1995). Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford. (Chapters 13, 14)

Course Outline Chapter 1. Introduction Chapter 2. Properties and representations of a game Chapter 3. Static games Chapter 4. Dynamic and repeated games


Intervenant(s)

AURELIE BONEIN-TUROLLA